Thursday, May 26, 2016

Sunday, May 8, 2016

ALP's Anne Aly's Phoenix Consulting of Dubai provides covert intel training-Who does she report to in Dubai, and then there is the matter of Malaysia.......

by Ganesh Sahathevan


Anne Aly is Labor candidate for the WA seat of Cowan.
She is regularly touted as an expert in "counter-terrorism" despite lacking any experience in the area.
Meanwhile, ignored here in Australia is her work for the private contractor Phoenix Group Consulting of Dubai, whose services include covert intelligence training.
Voters are entitled to know what she does, who she reports to, and who she otherwise deals with.
Then, there is the issue of her referring questions from local journalists to person or persons in Malaysia........
END













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Dr Anne (Azza) Aly



Dr Anne Aly was born in Egypt and raised in Australia. She is a research fellow at Curtin University with a focus on radicalization, counter terrorism and countering violent extremism. Anne is currently the recipient of an ARC grant to explore how community engagement and uses of terrorist attack sites can function as part of a broader counter terrorism and security approach. She has written over 40 publications on topics ranging from Islamic identity to counter narratives and the policy response to violent extremism. Anne is the author of four books including Terrorism and Global Security: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan). She was appointed to the board of the Council for Australian Arab Relations in 2009 and is currently serving a second term on the board. Also in 2009, she received the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers publications award for her theoretical model of internet radicalization. In 2011, Anne was inducted into the inaugural WA Women’s Hall of Fame for her contributions to national security and counter terrorism. In 2013 she was named one of WA’s 50 most successful women by SCOOP magazine. Anne is also the Founding Chair of People Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) a not for profit organization focused on empowering communities to challenge violent extremism.


Read more: http://www.pgcdubai.com/our-people/

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

China says Darwin , PNG, parts of the China Belt And Road Initiative :Turnbull defence of Darwin Port deal looking increasingly shady....

by Ganesh Sahathevan




The map above  and accompanying literature has been extracted from the Hong Kong Trade And Development Council  (HKTDC).website. Despite its promotional motif ,the map shows that China intends for its Belt & Road Initiative to include Darwin, and the literature discloses China's intention to seek a harmonization of at least trade laws across the "Belt and Road" , well outside Chinese jurisdiction.
That Malcolm Turnbull , ASIO chief Duncan Lewis, and Defense Secretary Dennis Richardson saw no problem with the Darwin Port deal raises questions of competence and impropriety. One recall that Turnbull probably lied about the Port's military significance in an attempt to justify his decision.



What is Belt and Road Initiative

A Roadmap to Start Your Own Business

The Belt and Road Initiative refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a significant development strategy launched by the Chinese government with the intention of promoting economic co-operation among countries along the proposed Belt and Road routes. The Initiative has been designed to enhance the orderly free flow of economic factors and the efficient allocation of resources. It is also intended to further market integration and create a regional economic co-operation framework of benefit to all. 

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued its Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road on 28 March 2015. This outlined the framework, key areas of co-operation and co-operation mechanisms with regard to the Belt and Road Initiative.

Conceptual Framework

The Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Europe and Africa along five routes. The Silk Road Economic Belt focusses on: (1) linking China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; (2) connecting China with the Middle East through Central Asia; and (3) bringing together China and Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, meanwhile, focusses on using Chinese coastal ports to: (4) link China with Europe through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean; and (5) connect China with the South Pacific Ocean through the South China Sea. 

Focussing on the above five routes, the Belt and Road will take advantage of international transport routes as well as core cities and key ports to further strengthen collaboration and build six international economic co-operation corridors. These have been identified as the New Eurasia Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar. 

(1) The New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor 

The New Eurasia Land Bridge, also known as the Second Eurasia Land Bridge, is an international railway line running from Lianyungang in China’s Jiangsu province through Alashankou in Xinjiang to Rotterdam in Holland. The China section of the line comprises the Lanzhou-Lianyungang Railway and the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway and stretches through eastern, central and western China. After exiting Chinese territory, the new land bridge passes through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland, reaching a number of coastal ports in Europe. Capitalising on the New Eurasia Land Bridge, China has opened an international freight rail route linking Chongqing to Duisburg (Germany); a direct freight train running between Wuhan and Mělník and Pardubice (Czech Republic); a freight rail route from Chengdu to Lodz (Poland); and a freight rail route from Zhengzhou to Hamburg (Germany). All these new rail routes offer rail-to-rail freight transport, as well as the convenience of “one declaration, one inspection, one cargo release” for any cargo transported. 

(2) The China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor 

Linked by land, China, Mongolia and Russia have long established various economic ties and co-operation by way of frontier trade and cross-border co-operation. In September 2014, when the three country’s heads of state met for the first time at the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) Dushanbe Summit, agreement was reached on forging tripartite co-operation on the basis of China-Russia, China-Mongolia and Russia-Mongolia bilateral ties. At the same meeting, the principles, directions and key areas of trilateral co-operation were defined. The three heads of state also agreed to bring together the building of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, the renovation of Russia’s Eurasia Land Bridge and the proposed development of Mongolia’s Steppe Road. This commitment will strengthen rail and highway connectivity and construction, advance customs clearance and transport facilitation, promote cross-national co-operation in transportation, and help establish the China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor. In July 2015, the three leaders held a second meeting in the Russian city of Ufa. This second summit saw the official adoption of the Mid-term Roadmap for Development of Trilateral Co-operation between China, Russia and Mongolia. 

(3) China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor 

The China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor runs from Xinjiang in China and exits the country via Alashankou to join the railway networks of Central Asia and West Asia before reaching the Mediterranean coast and the Arabian Peninsula. The corridor mainly covers five countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) as well as Iran and Turkey in West Asia. 

At the third China-Central Asia Co-operation Forum, held in Shandong in June 2015, a commitment to “jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt” was incorporated into a joint declaration signed by China and the five Central Asian countries. Prior to that, China had signed bilateral agreements on the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China had also concluded a co-operation document with Uzbekistan on the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt. This was aimed at further deepening and expanding mutually beneficial co-operation in such areas as trade, investment, finance, transport and communication. The national development strategies of the five Central Asian countries – including Kazakhstan’s “Road to Brightness”, Tajikistan’s “Energy, Transport and Food” (a three-pronged strategy aimed at revitalising the country), and Turkmenistan’s “Strong and Happy Era” – all share common ground with the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt. 

(4) China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor 

During the Fifth Leaders Meeting on Greater Mekong Sub-regional Economic Co-operation, held in Bangkok in December 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang put forward three suggestions with regard to deepening the relations between China and the five countries in the Indochina Peninsula. The suggestions included: (1) jointly planning and building an extensive transportation network, as well as number of industrial co-operation projects; (2) creating a new mode of co-operation for fundraising; and (3) promoting sustainable and co-ordinated socio-economic development. Currently, the countries along the Greater Mekong River are engaged in building nine cross-national highways, connecting east and west and linking north to south. A number of these construction projects have already been completed. Guangxi, for example, has already finished work on an expressway leading to the Friendship Gate and the port of Dongxing at the China-Vietnam border. The province has also opened an international rail line, running from Nanning to Hanoi, as well as introducing air routes to several major Southeast Asian cities. 

(5) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 

The concept of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was first raised by Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013. At the time, the objective was to build an economic corridor running from Kashgar, Xinjiang, in the north, to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port in the south. At present, the two governments have mapped out a provisional long-term plan for building highways, railways, oil and natural gas pipelines and optic fibre networks stretching from Kashgar to Gwadar Port. According to a joint declaration issued by China and Pakistan in Islamabad in April 2015, the two countries will proactively advance key co-operation projects, including phase II of the upgrade and renovation of the Karakoram Highway (the Thakot-Havelian section), an expressway at the east bay of Gwadar Port, a new international airport, an expressway from Karachi to Lahore (the Multan-Sukkur section), the Lahore rail transport orange line, the Haier-Ruba economic zone, and the China-Pakistan cross-national optic fibre network. 

(6) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor 

In a series of meetings during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, China and India jointly proposed the building of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. In December 2013, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor Joint Working Group convened its first meeting in Kunming. Official representatives from the four countries conducted in-depth discussions with regard to the development prospects, priority areas of co-operation and co-operation mechanisms for the economic corridor. They also reached extensive consensus on co-operation in such areas as transportation infrastructure, investment and commercial circulation, and people-to-people connectivity. The four parties signed meeting minutes and agreed the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor joint study programme, establishing a mechanism for promoting co-operation among the four governments.

Key Areas of Co-operation

The five major goals of the Belt and Road Initiative are: policy co-ordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. 

In terms of specifics, policy co-ordination means that countries along the belt and road will, via consultation on an equal footing, jointly formulate development plans and measures for advancing cross-national or regional co-operation; resolve problems arising from co-operation through consultation; and jointly provide policy support to practical co-operation and large-scale project implementation. 

Facilities connectivity refers to prioritising areas of construction as part of the Belt and Road strategy. Efforts will be made to give priority to removing barriers in the missing sections and bottleneck areas of core international transportation passages, advancing the construction of port infrastructure facilities, and clearing land-water intermodal transport passages. The connectivity of infrastructure facilities, including railways, highways, air routes, telecommunications, oil and natural gas pipelines and ports, will also be promoted. This will form part of a move to establish an infrastructure network connecting various Asian sub-regions with other parts of Asia, Europe and Africa. 

In order to facilitate unimpeded trade, steps will be taken to resolve investment and trade facilitation issues, reduce investment and trade barriers, lower trade and investment costs, as well as to promote regional economic integration. Efforts will also be made to broaden the scope of trade, propel trade development through investment, and strengthen co-operation in the industry chain with all related countries. 

With regard to financial integration, action will be taken to enhance co-ordination in monetary policy, expand the scope of local currency settlement and currency exchange in trade and investment between countries along the route, deepen multilateral and bilateral financial co-operation, set up regional development financial institutions, strengthen co-operation in monitoring financial risks, and enhance the ability of managing financial risks through regional arrangements. 

In terms of people-to-people bonds, efforts will be made to promote exchanges and dialogues between different cultures, strengthen friendly interactions between the people of various countries, and heighten mutual understanding and traditional friendships. This will all form the basis for the advancement of regional co-operation.

Co-operation Mechanisms

The Belt and Road Initiative upholds the principles of jointly developing the programme through consultation with all interested parties. Existing bilateral and multilateral co-operation mechanisms will be utilised to promote the integration of the development strategies of the countries along the route. Steps will be taken to advance the signing of co-operation memorandums of understanding or co-operation plans for the establishment of a number of bilateral co-operation demonstration projects. Efforts will also be made to set up a sound bilateral joint work mechanism, and to devise an implementation plan and action roadmap for advancing the Belt and Road strategy.

The Silk Road Fund

The US$40 billion Silk Road Fund has been established to finance the Belt and Road Initiative. It will invest mainly in infrastructure and resources, as well as in industrial and financial cooperation. The Fund was set up as a limited liability company in December 2014 with its founding shareholders including China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China Investment Corp, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank. The Fund will comply with market rules and the international order of finance, and welcome participation from domestic and overseas investors, such as the China-Africa Development Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The AIIB, a new multilateral development bank (MDB), has been set up with a view to complementing and cooperating with the existing MDBs in order to address infrastructure needs in Asia. AIIB will focus on the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development and logistics. 

As of December 2015, all of the 57 Prospective Founding Members of AIIB had signed the Articles of Agreement. The initial signatories were Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

The AIIB Articles of Agreement entered into force on 25 December 2015. On 16 January 2016, the Board of Governors held its inaugural meeting, declaring the Bank open for business and electing Mr. Jin Liqun as President for an initial five-year term. 

Content provided byHKTDC Research



Friday, April 29, 2016

Crouching (Turn)Bull, Hidden Rabbit Part 4: The DCNS Affair-Japanese "suspect Turnbull’s... business connections to China served France

by Ganesh Sahathevan 


As readers of this blog would be aware, the Turnbulls may well have an on-going, current , business connection with China.
In Crouching (Turn)Bull, Hidden Rabbit Parts 1 & 2 the matter of the exact nature of the Turnbull family's business was discussed in the context of the family's ties to China.

In Part 3,  US Government  suspicions about  Turnbull given his China connections were published,

And now, from The Australian , 30 April 2016,excerpts which show that Japan ,having just lost the AUD 50 billion submarine contract to France's corruption prone DCNS , is also wondering about the Turnbull's China connections, even if The Australian thinks these were in the past:


“They suspect China has been pulling the strings and Turnbull kowtowed to China. They also suspect Turnbull’s (past) business connections to China served France. 

There is speculation in Japan that this decision was taken by the Turnbull government based on its assessment of Australia’s relations with China. This sends a message that Australia will not be too close to Japan and possibly not even too close to the United States, especially in the South China Sea. If that’s true it also has an impact.”
Yoshiji Nogami, a former vice minister for foreign affairs and now president of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, responded with world weary sarcasm.
“So the submarines in operation lost to the submarines on paper,” he said, in reference to the fact that the French submarine does not yet exist but is merely a design concept.
“It’s just a coincidence but it’s very bad timing. The decision was announced only a couple of weeks after the Prime Minister (Turnbull) visited Beijing and Beijing has been interfering in Australian domestic politics.”




Japan sees Chinese hand in decision to overlook Soryu

Australia’s standing in Japan, our most important geo-strategic partner in Asia, is deeply diminished as a result of the decision to reject its offer to build 12 new submarines for us.
On Monday the Turnbull government notified Tokyo, and on Tuesday it announced the successful bidder was the French firm DCNS.
Japanese opinion of us, elite as well as public opinion, is bruised, tender and bitter as a result.
Many Japanese believe Malcolm Turnbull kowtowed to the Chinese, folding under their unsubtle pressure. The Japanese also believe they were collateral damage in Turnbull’s intense hostility to Japan’s friend, Tony Abbott. These views may be completely unjustified but they are widespread.
Some influential Japanese are even starting to publicly question Australia’s reliability as a strategic partner. There is a sense of Australia not being altogether a serious country.
That important Japanese are saying these things in public ought to give Canberra the most serious pause for reflection.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his government only ever got involved in our submarines because an Australian prime minister, Tony Abbott, asked them to do so.
But then the terms of their engagement kept changing. Australia’s requirements kept changing, as did the identity of our political leadership — the Japanese dealt with three different defence ministers and two different prime ministers over the course of this unhappy saga. Still, all the way along, they were given every reason to think they were still the preferred supplier.
Then their humiliating rejection was leaked in the media before they were told anything about it.
Official Japanese reaction was measured but did not try to conceal Tokyo’s shock and hostility at the outcome.
“The decision was deeply regrettable,” said Japan’s Defence Minister, Gen Nakatani, who demanded a full explanation from Canberra.
On the day of the announcement, I interviewed Seiji Kihara, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, who confirmed that even at the highest levels Japan had expected, right up until the devastating leak against it, that it would be successful.
Kihara’s comments to me reflect the sober caution of a professional foreign ministry.
“Because the submarine was the symbol of Japan-Australia defence co-operation, and Japan brought both the civilian and government (sectors) together on the project, it is very disappointing that we were not chosen,” he said.
“We accept the decision with humility and sincerity, and quite separately we wish to develop further security co-operation between Japan and Australia.”
You don’t have to travel far beyond the most elevated reaches of official Japanese politeness, however, to get a much starker and more alarming assessment.
Yoichi Funabashi is by a long distance the most influential foreign affairs commentator in modern Japan. Now head of a prestigious think tank, he is a former newspaper editor, a widely read columnist and author of countless internationally acclaimed books on Asian politics, geo-strategic issues, regional co-operation and the US alliance system. He is no hawk, being associated with the centre left of politics, and he knows Australia intimately.
So his words are doubly telling.
“The initial reaction to the deal from the Japanese government and on the part of the defence community has been very much negative,” he says.
“They suspect China has been pulling the strings and Turnbull kowtowed to China. They also suspect Turnbull’s (past) business connections to China served France. All these conspiracy theories are running wild.
“The Abe administration, and the Japanese government generally, were very uncomfortable with the previous Labor government in Canberra. They were very happy to have their soulmate, Tony Abbott, a man they saw as similar to John Howard, replace Labor. Then they were sorry to see Abbott replaced by Turnbull. But they never expected that the higher level promise to Abe from Abbott would be so shabbily trashed.”
Funabashi sees wider strategic implications from the debacle, and they are not good implications for Australia.
“It has been a rude awakening for Abe to see how shallow that US-Japan-Australia facade is — that semi-alliance, just how easily shattered that was.”
Funabashi believes strategic hard heads in Washington will also draw negative lessons about Australia from this episode.
“The US also is naturally very disappointed in this decision,” he says. “They have not hidden their desire to have Australia choose the Soryu (Japanese) submarine. So they too will take a more sober view of trilateral strategic co-operation.”
It is worth pausing here to note Funabashi’s statement of the obvious: that while remaining formally neutral in public, and respecting Australia’s sovereignty, and understanding that ultimately Canberra would choose the best submarine capability available (if one was clearly much better than the others), the Americans nonetheless enthusiastically backed the Japanese and wanted them to win.
Everyone seriously associated with this issue internationally knows this to be the case. That some government officials and one commercial bidder were able to hoodwink several credulous Australian commentators into claiming the Americans were not backing the Japanese is a depressing testament to the shallowness and provincialism of the Australian media and often the strategic debate. Very few commentators have independent foreign sources against whom they can test and verify the stories they are told locally, especially by government. This is a function of Australia’s isolation, and as a result the Australian view of reality in many policy sectors is deeply skewed and inaccurate.
Funabashi also fully acknowledges the weakness of the Japanese bid, its failure to understand how quickly Australian domestic politics was moving or to hire smart local lobbyists early in the process.
Some measure of Funabashi’s analysis is widely shared in Japan and across Asia.
The subs decision was front page news in the Asian editions of The Financial Times andThe Wall Street Journal. The Journal ran an editorial lamenting the opportunity lost for enhanced Australia-Japan strategic co-operation. The editorial’s cross heading was lethal for Australia’s reputation. It said: “Australia rejects a Japanese bid after Chinese pressure.”
The critical reaction is virtually universal among Japanese familiar with international relations.
In Kyoto I meet Hiroshi Nakanishi, an international relations scholar at Kyoto University. He offers the double barrelled Japanese response. The decision won’t destroy Australia-Japan co-operation, he says, but on the other hand: “When it comes to the concrete implementation of co-operation, it might have a long-term impact.”
And he makes this further judgment: “There is speculation in Japan that this decision was taken by the Turnbull government based on its assessment of Australia’s relations with China. This sends a message that Australia will not be too close to Japan and possibly not even too close to the United States, especially in the South China Sea. If that’s true it also has an impact.”
Yoshiji Nogami, a former vice minister for foreign affairs and now president of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, responded with world weary sarcasm.
“So the submarines in operation lost to the submarines on paper,” he said, in reference to the fact that the French submarine does not yet exist but is merely a design concept.
“It’s just a coincidence but it’s very bad timing. The decision was announced only a couple of weeks after the Prime Minister (Turnbull) visited Beijing and Beijing has been interfering in Australian domestic politics.”
Like most people I spoke to in Japan in a week of intensive conversations, Nogami believes, or at least says he believes, that Australia-Japan strategic co-operation will continue to grow because both parties want and need it, though Funabashi cautions there may need to be a cooling-off period.
The sense of disappointment and even betrayal runs across both sides of Japanese politics.
Akihisa Nagashima is a leading politician in the centre left opposition Democratic Party.
He is a former vice minister for defence and national security adviser.
I asked Nagashima if the submarine decision was a setback to vital strategic operation in Asia.
“Yes it is,” he said. “It wouldn’t have been just the submarine itself but all the training and co-operation that goes with it. It’s not just the physical asset; many, many other factors would deepen co-operation.”
However, in a perfectly polite Japanese fashion, Nagashima traces a series of events in Australian politics that affects, damagingly, the way Tokyo looks at Australia now.
“After Australia asked Japan for assistance in this matter, the decision is a result of joint efforts,” he says, “so I don’t want to blame one side.”
And here is the kicker.
“I wonder how the transition in Australian domestic politics affected the submarine deal, from Abbott to Turnbull.
“Recently Turnbull brought a thousand business people to visit Beijing. I just wonder what these actions reveal, and the case of the Chinese so-called private company getting the lease of the Port of Darwin from an Australian government. There was a series of events and the question is how the series of events affected the submarine deal. I don’t know, maybe it was a fair process, I believe.”
Across the board, the Japanese recognise the inadequacies and failings of their own actions. Mitsubishi and Kawasaki were too slow in making a full-blooded commercial commitment to the project. Because they thought they were dealing with a friend and ally, the Japanese weren’t cynical enough in their appreciation of Australian politics.
The Japanese have certainly learnt a lot of lessons from this. One of them, dolefully, may be not to put too much faith and trust in Australia, especially in strategic matters; not to take Australia altogether seriously as a strategic player, even in its own interests.
From Australia’s point of view, this has been one of the worst and most damaging episodes in the postwar relationship with Japan.
This was an episode of vast consequence and epic complexity.
You feel that a lot more information will come out about it in the future.
One story doing the rounds in Japan is that Barack Obama gave Turnbull a pass to choose the French at the very last moment. That would be consistent with the Americans supporting the Japanese all the way through but not going to the wire for them.
And the bigger regional consequences?
Beijing feels delightedly vindicated. It bullied Australia with crude public warnings against choosing the Japanese submarines, and from Beijing’s point of view that bullying worked a treat.
The lessons? Australia can be bullied effectively, and bullying is a good tactic.
Japan feels isolated once more and this isolation reinforces its security anxiety. This anxiety, many analysts believe, in the long run could tempt Japan to look once more at an independent nuclear option. If none of its allies is reliable, it may need to guarantee absolutely its own security, as Donald Trump has suggested.
Asia more widely sees Australia buckling to Chinese pressure. The US is reminded once more of the fickleness of allies.
These perceptions may be unfair but they are widespread.
Finally, if all that our leaders routinely say about the complex security environment we face is true, if their words on the need for us to engage Asia have any meaning, and if all the blather that everyone talks about relative American decline and potential strategic retrenchment in Asia is true, then one thing we need almost more than anything else is a close relationship with Japan.
This whole sorry, messed-up episode has set that back a long, long way. Don’t be fooled for a minute into thinking that doesn’t matter

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Payne's admission requires investigation of submarine contracts: Is l'affaire Adelaide a repeat of DCNS's l'affaire Karachi?



by Ganesh Sahathevan

Australian Defence Minsiter Marise Payne protested on ABC last night that her boyfriend's "attempt" at contacting DCNS in Paris just a week before she announced DCNS as winner of the Competitive Evaluation Process for AUD 50 billion contract for the construction of 12 submarines, was nothing more than what any trade minister would do as part of the Process. 
In Payne's words ::


MARISE PAYNE: No. I understand that that is part of a series of meetings that any Trade Minister from Australia from any state in the Commonwealth, frankly, would endeavour to have with participants in the CEP (Competitive Evaluation Process) process.

As explained in the previous post :
The CEP was basically a fashion parade, so it is hard to see why there was any need for anyone to seek a meeting with any  bidder

unless it was to provide assistance with the bidding process.

Payne has , in effect ,admitted that there has been at least an attempt to do so  by her boyfriend, Stuart Ayres. This would not of course be the first time that DCNS has managed to combine elections, election funding ,and a contract for submarines.
l'affaire Karachi is yet to be resolved.
END 

Doing business with the corruption prone DCNS-Australian Defence Minister's boyfriend "tried" to meet with DCNS in France last week

by Ganesh Sahathevan

An excerpt from a transcript of the interview between Australian Defence Minister Marise Payne and journalist Emma Alberici: 

EMMA ALBERICI: OK. I just want to shift to something else because we learned today that your partner, Stuart Ayres, who is the NSW Minister for Trade, was last week in France and sought a meeting with DCNS, which apparently did not go ahead. I want to know: did you try in any way to intervene to seek that meeting between Stuart Ayres and members of DCNS last week?

MARISE PAYNE: No. I understand that that is part of a series of meetings that any Trade Minister from Australia from any state in the Commonwealth, frankly, would endeavour to have with participants in the CEP (Competitive Evaluation Process process. As you've indicated, the meeting didn't proceed, I understand from his statement due to times not merging with the appropriate program that he had. And finally, I in no way approached Defence or engaged with Defence on this matter.

EMMA ALBERICI: Or anybody else in France ...

MARISE PAYNE: No


Ayres is Minister for Trade, Tourism & Major Events, Minister for Sport,New South Wales.The state government has no role whatsoever in defence, which is a federal matter.The CEP was basically a fashion parade, so it is hard to see why there was any need for any meetings between politicians and CEP participants.

Ayres may not have "engaged with Defence" but he is clearly constantly engaging with the Minister For Defence.
Had these same facts presented in any other country in this region awarding any kind of defence contract, media and the opposition would by now demand a full investigation into the Minister's financial affairs, and for a review of the award of the contract. In  Australia on the other hand it is assumed that our politicians are above corruption.

END 
For Reference

Doing business with the corruption prone DCNS-Are Australian politicians ,civil servants, exceptionally honest,pure ,possessing moral fortitude lacking in others?

Monday, April 25, 2016

Doing business with the corruption prone DCNS-Are Australian politicians ,civil servants, exceptionally honest,pure ,possessing moral fortitude lacking in others?



by Ganesh Sahatevan

It is being reported that DCNS of France is to be awarded the AUD 50 billion contract to build Australia's next generation of submarines.

Meanwhile, there has been no commentary in Australia about DCNS's history of corruption.

In Malaysia:

Malaysia's government has denied allegations of corruption in its $1.25 billion purchase of two submarines as it responded for the first time to a French investigation into alleged bribery payments in the deal.

The allegations have emerged in a French investigative case examining whether French shipbuilding giant DCNS paid bribes to Malaysian officials.

Malaysian human rights group SUARAM and its French lawyers have alleged that DCNS bought classified Malaysian defence ministry documents to help its bid for the 1 billion euro ($1.25 billion) contract it won in 2002. They say investigation documents show that about 36 million euros ($44.90 million) were paid by Thales International, a subsidiary of DCNS, to a company called Terasasi, controlled by a former associate of Najib.



In Taiwan:


The Taiwanese government has filed a US$98.4 million lawsuit against the French state-owned DCNS over a long-running, massive corruption case that puts added pressure on the defense contractor at a time when it faces multiple investigations that could bring down top French politicians.

The allegations, announced by Taiwan’s Defense Minister Kao Hua-chun in Parliament last week, are also an indication that the French contractors apparently continued with illegal activities well after the original scandal was uncovered. Kao said additional kickbacks prohibited by a 1996 order agreement have been found relating to supplying parts for the problem-plagued stealth frigates, which cost US$2.8 billion in 1991. Taiwan is seeking the additional penalty for alleged violation of the 1996 agreement, bringing the total to well over US$1 billion.


The purchase of the six frigates has been marked by earlier allegations of massive corruption, multiple murders, and demands for fines against the French shipbuilder for US$950 million, most of it already owed by the defense contractor and the French state under international court rulings. The French government has already agreed to pay €457 million in damages to Taiwan, which is a big enough amount to require an emergency amendment to the national operating budget.


In Pakistan,The Karachi Affair
So convoluted, one report is reproduced in full:



Political scandal brews over 11 Frenchmen killed in Pakistan
By Michael Cosgrove Jun 19, 2009 in Politics
A major political scandal is gaining momentum in France after revelations that 11 Frenchmen killed in a 2002 Karachi bus bombing were victims of a Pakistani plot to punish France for non-payment of commission on a deal involving the sale of submarines.








Not only is it a scandal here in France, but it may well turn into an international affair.
The Karachi bombing victims were all engineers employed by the DCN, the French company which holds a quasi-monopoly on the construction of French warships and submarines. The attack also killed three Pakistanis and injured many others.
They were in Pakistan to work on three Agosta 90 B submarines which were sold to the Pakistan military in a deal signed in 1994. Payment was to be spread over ten years and, as is usual in business deals involving military hardware, commission was promised to the middlemen involved. These middlemen included Pakistani and Saudi Arabian nationals. Saudi Arabia has traditionally been a source of cash funding for Pakistan, and its role in the deal was that it paid up front for the submarines.
The attack shocked the French, who immediately sent investigators to Karachi. They almost instantly claimed that Al Qaida, which was very active at that time, was behind the bombing. The affair slowly drifted out of public view in the months that followed.
It has resurfaced with a bang with revelations that the attack was indeed carried out by Islamic militants, but with the help of the Pakistani military and secret services.
The claims have been made by family members of those killed, lawyers representing them, and even judges, in the context of the official enquiry into the bombing, which is still ongoing.
At the time the deal was signed, French politicians, notably Edouard Balladur and Jacques Chirac, were trying to outdo each other in their search for campaign funds for the upcoming Presidential elections in 1995. Balladur was the French Prime Minister at that time, and as such he was an essential player in any international arms deal.
Balladur's Budget Minister at the time was current French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy supported Balladur's candidature for the Presidency, a gesture for which Chirac would never forgive him.
The deal represented a lot of money and a source of campaign funding too.
Balladur was beaten in the election however and Chirac became President. Soon afterward, he ordered the cancellation of the progressive commission payments being made to senior Pakistani military personnel and others.
“The Al Qaida track has been totally abandoned. The mobile for the attack now appears to be linked to the stopping of commission payments. This is turning into a state affair” said Olivier Morice, lawyer for seven of the bereaved families, after a recent meeting with anti-terrorist judges Marc Trévidic and Yves Jannier.
“The commission payments (to Pakistan) were stopped when Jaques Chirac became President in 1995 in order that retro-commissions (..destined for the financing of Balladur’s campaign..) were not paid” he continued.
One of the anti-terrorist judges “said that this scenario had a cruel logic to it” said Magali Drouet, the daughter of one of the victims.
In this scenario, the attack was carried out in reprisals for the non-payment of commission. The current Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari, was the Investment Minister at the time in his wife Benazir Bhutto’s government. Zardari has been accused of corruption and money laundering many times.
Drouet went on to say that “this is a state-level affair which implicates France, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, a source of funding for Pakistan.”
This new track was uncovered last year by police but has only just been revealed. The police, acting under orders from judges, were investigating affairs of corruption and arms deals. They found documents on the premises of the DCN (now called DCNS) which revealed the names of companies who transited arms sales commissions.
One of the documents mentions the “instrumentalisation” of Islamic militants by Pakistani Secret Service and Army personnel. It says that “the Karachi attack was carried out thanks to connivance from within the Army and from elements of support for Islamic guerrillas” within the Pakistani Secret Services. It goes on to mention that the bombing was carried out “for financial reasons....designed to obtain the payment of unpaid commission.”
In another strange development, investigators are also looking into the judicial aspects of the bombing enquiry carried out at the time by French police in Pakistan. The judicial enquiry was suddenly halted in 2003.
Initially included in the evidence was a collection of photographs taken by Randall Bennett, the head of the American diplomatic security service in Pakistan at that time. Bennett also ran the investigation into the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist later executed by Al Qaida.
The photographs in question were those that Bennett took at the scene of the bombing. They were later destroyed under a French court orde

Read more: http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/274427#ixzz46tS0Ih00


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